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Representing the Insincere: Strategically Robust Proportional
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BARTON E. LEE
Proportional representation (PR) is a fundamental principle of many democracies world-wide which employ
PR-based voting rules to elect their representatives. e normative properties of these voting rules however,
are oen only understood in the context of sincere voting.
In this paper we consider PR in the presence of strategic voters. We construct a voting rule such that
for every preference profile there exists at least one costly voting equilibrium satisfying PR with respect to
voters’ private and unrevealed preferences – such a voting rule is said to be strategically robust. In contrast,
a commonly applied voting rule is shown not be strategically robust. Furthermore, we prove a limit on ‘how
strategically robust’ a PR-based voting rule can be; we show that there is no PR-based voting rule which
ensures that every equilibrium satisfies PR. Collectively, our results highlight the possibility and limit of
achieving PR in the presence of strategic voters and a positive role for mechanisms, such as pre-election
polls, which coordinate voter behaviour towards equilibria which satisfy PR.
1 INTRODUCTION
e first principle of democracy [is] representation in proportion to numbers –
John Stuart Mill in Considerations on Representative Government (1861).
Multi-seat (or multi-winner) election outcomes which proportionally represent the diverse pref-
erences of voters, are said to provide proportional representation (PR). Informally speaking, PR
captures the idea that if n% of voters support a certain political party then roughly n% of the seats
should be allocated to this party. In democratic elections, PR has long been considered a major
desideratum [Droop, 1881, Dumme, 1984, Tideman and Richardson, 2000]. As per the political
philosopher John Stuart Mill, PR is the “first principle of democracy” [Mill, 1861]. is view is also
shared by many others, including [Woodall, 1997] who commented that PR is “a sine qua non for a
fair election rule”. In practice, PR is a fundamental goal of national elections world-wide including
Australia, India, Ireland and Pakistan; all of which elect parliamentary representatives via a voting
rule understood to satisfy PR. Furthermore, countries which do not pursue PR in their national
elections are oen subject to vigorous debate from prominent electoral reform movements such
as the Electoral Reform Society (UK), Fair Vote Canada, and FairVote (US). ese movements have
led to referenda over electoral reform in the UK (2011), Ontario (2007), and British Columbia (2005).
In 2018, British Columbia is expected to hold another referendum for the adoption of a PR electoral
system.
e family of voting systems used around the world to achieve PR, which we call PR-based
voting rules, are only known to satisfy PR when voters are assumed to sincerely express their
preferences.1 However it has long been established that, under very general conditions, every non-
dictatorial voting rule is vulnerable tomanipulation by strategic, or self-interested, voters [Gibbard,
1973, Saerthwaite, 1975]. Furthermore, empirical studies have shown that strategic voting indeed
occurs in real-world electionswhich use PR-based voting rules [Frede´n, 2014, Gschwend and Stoiber,
2014]. us, it is unclear in practice and in the presence of strategic voters whether or not PR-based
voting rules satisfy PR.
1For the case of the Single Transferable Vote (STV) rule we refer the reader to [Dumme, 1984], and [Woodall, 1994]
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Designing voting rules which achieve a normative property such as PR in the presence of strate-
gic voters is a mechanism design problem. A typical approach in this literature, is to provide
incentives for voters to truthfully reveal their preferences such that an election outcome which
satisfies PR can be produced [Parkes, 2001, Chapter 2]. In this case, the PR-based voting rule is
said to be strategyproof and so, even in the presence of strategic voters, PR is expected to be satis-
fied. In general the previously mentioned result of Gibbard and Saerthwaite tells us that no such
voting rule exists since there is no strategyproof non-dictatorial voting rule, let alone a rule which
also satisfies PR. Crucially, this impossibility result of Gibbard and Saerthwaite relies on voters
being able to possess arbitrary preferences. In reality however, voter preferences embody greater
structure; this has led researchers to study elections and voting rules under assumptions such as
correlated preferences [Mandal and Parkes, 2016, Sen et al., 2015], and with additional restrictions
on preferences [Arrow, 1951, Black, 1948, Sen, 1966]. One particular restriction of preferences is
that of dichotomous preferences over candidates [Bogomolnaia et al., 2005, Brams and Fishburn,
1978], whereby voters view each candidate as either ‘approved’ or ‘disapproved’, but not both.2
is preference restriction has aracted particular aention since it completely circumvents the
impossibility result of Gibbard and Saerthwaite; that is, there exists a non-dictatorial voting rule
which is strategyproof [Brams and Fishburn, 1978, Weber, 1978]. Unfortunately, even in this re-
stricted seing, there is no strategyproof PR-based voting rule [Peters, 2017]. is impossibility
result of Peters highlights a stark barrier to achieving PR in presence of strategic voters, and sug-
gests the need for an alternate approach which does not require truthful-revelation of preferences
by voters.
In this paper we consider an alternate equilibrium approach and show that PR can indeed be
achieved in the presence of strategic voters when voters have dichotomous preferences over can-
didates.3 We design a strategically robust PR-based voting rule which is not strategyproof but
ensures the existence of at least one (possibly insincere) costly voting equilibrium satisfying PR
with respect to voters’ private and unrevealed preferences. In contrast, a commonly applied voting
rule is shown not to be strategically robust. Furthermore, we prove a limit on ‘how strategically ro-
bust’ a PR-based voting rule can be; we show that there is no PR-based voting rule4 which ensures
that every costly voting equilibrium satisfies PR. Collectively, these results highlight the possibility
and limit of achieving PR in the presence of strategic voters and a positive role for mechanisms,
such as pre-election polls, which coordinate voter behaviour towards equilibria which satisfy PR.
Contributions. Our contributions are four-fold; firstly we introduce a new novel approach for the
social choice literature to consider (possibly) insincere but desirable election outcomes; secondly,
we provide positive results showing the existence of strategically robust PR-based voting rules
which satisfy PR in the presence of strategic voters; thirdly we provide an impossibility result
for the full implementation of proportional representation. is laer result highlights a limit on
‘how robust’ a PR-based voting can be to strategic voters. As a final conceptual contribution, our
work sheds light on features of voting rules (such as election thresholds) which lead to strategic
robustness and insights into how a given voting rule can be modified to be strategically robust and
whilst still maintaining some of the original (sincere voting) properties.
Outline. e structure of the paper is as follows; section 2 presents the model and describes
our equilibria refinement, and section 3 presents some background for the sincere voting seing.
2Note that a voter with dichotomous preferences over candidates does not, in general, have dichotomous preferences over
(multi-winner) election outcomes.
3Justification for this equilibrium approach to achieving PR, over introducing further restrictions on voter preferences, is
provided in section 2.1. aer the statement of eorem 2.4.
4We assume the voting rule is deterministic, resolute and anonymous.
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Section 4 includes our key results showing that indeed there exist insincere equilibria which guar-
antee proportional representation, subsection 4.1. includes our full-implementation impossibility
result, the paper then concludes with a brief conclusion.
1.1 Related literature
Proportional representation axioms: In the context of multi-winner approval elections and
voters with dichotomous preferences over candidates, the social choice community has intensely
studied proportional representation axioms. In this seing a particularly compelling notion of
proportional representation was formulated in [Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al., 2017] called proportional
justified representation (PJR). is notion of proportional representation is the focus of this paper.
Much of the literature has focused on computational concerns about computing election outcomes
satisfying these, or similar, axioms when voters are assumed to vote sincerely [Aziz et al., 2017,
2018, Brill et al., 2017, Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al., 2017]. ere also exists a substantial body of re-
search which consider the computational complexity of identifying strategically beneficial actions
and equilibria under different voting rules andwith different assumptions [Elkind et al., 2015, 2016,
Endriss et al., 2016, Lee, 2017, Meir et al., 2008a,b, Obraztsova et al., 2014]. However, to the best of
our knowledge no aempts have been made to construct or ask whether there exists voting rules
which satisfy a desirable notion, such as proportional representation, in the presence of strategic
voters and in (possibly) insincere equilibria.
Proportional representation in the presence strategic voters: ere are a number of pa-
pers which consider the implications of strategic voters in proportional representation voting sys-
tems [Austin-Smith and Banks, 1988, Baron and Diermeier, 2001, Cox and Shugart, 1996, De Sinopoli and Iannantuoni,
2008, De Sinopoli et al., 2014, Slinko and White, 2010], however their research questions and re-
sults differ from this paper. In particular, these papers study the observed characteristics and
properties of strategic equilibrium under PR systems; whilst, the focus of this paper is whether in
equilibrium the unobserved property of PR (with respect to voters’ private and unrevealed pref-
erences) can be satisfied; or relatedly, how the observed equilibrium outcomes under PR systems
qualitatively differ from the (unobserved) sincere voting outcome.
Approval voting and dichotomous preferences: Approval voting has been subject to intense
research in recent years [Brams and Fishburn, 2007, Lackner and Skowron, 2017]. One of the ap-
peals of approval voting is that under dichotomous preferences, a simple approval-based voting
rule is strategyproof [Brams and Fishburn, 1978,Weber, 1978], hence escaping the impossibility re-
sults of [Gibbard, 1973, Saerthwaite, 1975]. However, as shown by [Fishburn, 1978, Vorsatz, 2007]
the set of approval-based voting rules which are strategyproof is limited – in particular, under mild
conditions the approval voting rule can be completely and uniquely characterised by whether or
not it is strategyproof. More recently, and of greater relevance to this paper, [Peters, 2017] showed
that a very weak form of proportional representation is incompatible with strategyproofness when
considering deterministic voting rules. at is, there is no deterministic voting rule which is pro-
portionally representative and strategyproof. Our research direction complements and contrasts
this impossibility result by showing that, in fact, strategyproofness is not necessarily required to
ensure proportional representation in equilibrium.
Implementation theory: ere is an extensive literature on the implementation of social choice
functions/correspondences via equilibrium concepts such as Nash equilibria. e canonical full
implementation question is whether a mechanism can be designed such that every equilibrium
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produces an outcome which is considered ‘desirable’ with respect to a given social choice function
or correspondence – however this literature does not provide answers to the questions posed and
solved in this paper. In particular, the structure of mechanisms typically used in the implemen-
tation theory literature are not suited to standard voting environments. is is sometimes due
to the intricacies of the mechanism or the informational requirements. For example, the classical
literature pioneered by Maskin (see [Maskin, 1977, 1985]) assumes that every player knows every
other players’ “private” information, i.e., the entire profile of voter preferences.5 In the context
of voting this is indeed an extreme assumption which we do not apply in our model. Such infor-
mational requirements have been relaxed by a number of scholars [Abreu and Matsushima, 1990,
Jackson, 1992], but still the mechanisms are not appropriate for the environment and focus of this
paper. Despite this, and in line with the canonical full implementation question, we provide an
impossibility of full implementation result under assumptions appropriate for standard voting en-
vironments. In this environment, we show that it is impossible to fully implement the social choice
correspondence of proportional representation.
2 THE MODEL, EQUILIBRIA AND COSTLY VOTING
2.1 Model
We introduce the following social choice model, let N be a set of voters, C be a set of candidates.6
We assume that voters have dichotomous preference over candidates; for a given voter i ∈ N , let
Ai ⊆ C denote voter i’s true preference (i.e., most preferred equivalence class of candidates), and
henceC\Ai is the set, or equivalence class, of voter i’s unapproved, or disapproved, candidates. Let
Aˆi be the reported (not necessarily truthful) approval ballot. If Aˆi = Ai then we say the reported
ballot is truthful, or sincere, otherwise, Aˆi , Ai and we say that the reported ballot Aˆi is insincere.
We denote the profile of preferences and reported ballots byA and Aˆ; that is, A = (A1, . . . ,An) and
Aˆ = (Aˆ1, . . . , Aˆn), respectively.
e goal of the election is to select a winning commieeW ⊆ C of some predetermined size
k < |C | (where k is a positive integer). e value k is common knowledge. We assume voter i’s
(ordinal) preferences over election outcomes are as follows: given two commieesW andW ′,
W %i W
′ ⇐⇒ |W ∩ Ai | ≥ |W
′ ∩Ai |. (1)
e strict preference ≻i can be derived from the strict inequality. We emphasise that despite
voters having dichotomous preferences over candidates, given (1), voter preferences over election
outcomes need not be dichotomous.
If voters face election outcomes which are random, the voter must compare probabilistic out-
comes, or loeries, of election outcomes. We assume voter preferences over loeries are given by
the upward-lexicographic extension (ul-extension). e ul-extension relates to the lexicographic
preferences introduced by [Hausner, 1954]. Given the preferences of a voter over deterministic
election outcomes, the ul-extension derives preferences over loeries by comparing relative prob-
abilities of the worst case outcomes in a lexicographic manner; that is, the voter prefers loeries
which minimise the probability of ‘bad’ outcomes (we delay the formal definition for now).
e ul-extension is a strong assumption to apply however when considering extensions of or-
dinal preferences to loeries there are limited choices with the appropriate properties for equi-
librium analysis. For example, the commonly applied first-order stochastic dominance extension
5In this classical seing, the players’ preferences are common knowledge among other players but is “private” and unknown
from the perspective of the mechanism designer.
6is model can be easily reformulated as a party-seat model by partitioning the candidate set into parties and deriving
voter preferences over candidates from their preferences over parties.
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(sd-extension) is not complete; that is, two loeries may not be comparable. us if equilibrium
analysis were considered with the sd-extension, voters would only consider the restricted set of
strategies which lead to comparable loeries and hence many equilibria would arise simply be-
cause of the incompleteness of the preference extension. Whilst the ul-extension is complete, and
hence voters can always compare the loeries induced by any strategy deviation. Furthermore we
note that any loery preferred to another loery under the sd-extension, is also preferred under
the ul-extension. us, all of our equilibria results which assume the ul-extension also hold under
the sd-extension. We refer the reader to [Cho, 2012] for a detailed discussion of the ul-extension,
other related extensions, and their properties.
We now formalise the ul-extension with respect to the preference %i over (deterministic) elec-
tion outcomes introduced earlier. A loery is a probability distribution, L, over the set of possible
election outcomesW . Let pi
(i )
L
(j) denote the probability that the loery L produces an election
outcomeW such that |W ∩ Ai | = j . Note that
∑min{k, |Ai | }
j=0 pi
(i )
L
(j) = 1 for all i ∈ N .
A voter weakly prefers a loery L over another loery L′ if and only if;
(1) there exists an integer ℓ ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,k} such that pi
(i )
L
(j) = pi
(i )
L′
(j) for all j < ℓ and pi
(i )
L
(ℓ) <
pi
(i )
L′
(ℓ); or
(2) pi
(i )
L
(j) = pi
(i )
L′
(j) for all j .
Abusing notation slightly we denote the preference relation over loeries by %i . A voter strictly
prefers L over L′, i.e. L ≻i L
′, if L %i L
′ and there exists some integer j ∈ {0, . . . ,k} such that
pi
(i )
L
(j) , pi
(i )
L′
(j).
Remark 1. e ul-extension of preferences conveys a high level of risk-aversion. When consid-
ering a more risk-averse preference extension, such as worst-case preferences7 [Alon, 2015], then all
of our results still hold. In fact, in some cases stronger results can be aained. is suggest that a
higher degree of risk aversion is conducive to the goals of this paper; in particular, the construction of
strategically robust proportional representation voting rules. e opposite can be said for risk-loving
preference extensions.
We now introduce the proportional representation axiom of proportional justified representa-
tion (PJR), this axiomwas considered in [Aziz et al., 2018, Brill et al., 2017, Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al.,
2017]. PJR captures the idea that cohesive groups of voters, who unanimously agree on some set
of candidates as being ‘appproved’, should receive representation in proportion to their size.
Definition 2.1. [Proportional Justified Representation (PJR)] Given the (truthful) ballot profileA =
(A1, . . . ,An) over a candidate setC and a target commiee of size k , we say that a set of candidates
W of sizek satisfies proportional justified representation (PJR) for (A,k) if for every positive integer
ℓ ≤ k , ∀X ⊆ N :
|X | ≥ ℓn/k and | ∩i ∈X Ai | ≥ ℓ =⇒ |W ∩ (∪i ∈XAi )| ≥ ℓ.
In the case of a (random) loery L over election outcomes, we say that PJR is satisfied by L if every
non-zero probability election outcome satisfies PJR. at is, PJR is satisfied with probability one.
We shall assume throughout this paper that the number of candidates to be elected k divides
the number voters n. is assumption avoids the complications surrounding non-integer values
of n/k in the proportional representation definition (Definition 2.1). For general values of k and
n, and under sincere voting, PJR is considerably more difficult to satisfy – in fact, it was posed
as an open problem in [Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al., 2016b] and eventually resolved independently
7i.e., a voter values a loery based on the least preferred outcome.
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in [Brill et al., 2017] and [Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al., 2016a]. We formalise the assumption below,
but will always state our result explicitly with the condition that ‘k divides n’ when required.
Assumption 1. [‘k divides n’] Assume that the number of candidates to be elected, k , divides the
number of voters, n.
Remark 2. For general values of k and n, all of our results follow immediately for a slightly weaker
version of the PJR axiom. e weaker version specifies that cohesive groups of voters X of size ℓ⌈n/k⌉
require ℓ representatives, i.e., replace |X | ≥ ℓn/k with |X | ≥ ℓ⌈n/k⌉ in the (Definition 2.1).
e following result states that a PJR outcome exists for all preference profiles, we refer the
reader to [Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al., 2017] for a proof.
Theorem 2.2. [Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al., 2017] A PJR outcome always exists.
Given a voting rule which takes (Aˆ,k) as an input we denote the (possibly degenerate) loery
of election outcomes as LAˆ. Note that Aˆ is the reported ballot profile and need not be truthful, i.e.
it may be the case that Aˆ , A.
Definition 2.3. [strategyproof] A voting rule is said to be strategyproof if for all i ∈ N
L(Ai,Aˆ−i ) %i L(Aˆi,Aˆ−i ) for all Aˆi and for all Aˆ−i .
As mentioned in the introduction, [Peters, 2017] showed that there is in fact no (deterministic
and resolute8) voting rule which is strategyproof and satisfies a very weak notion of proportional
representation. An immediate implication of the results is that PJR is incompatible with strate-
gyproofness.
Theorem 2.4 ([Peters, 2017]). If |C |, |N | ≥ 4 and k ≥ 2 there exists no deterministic and resolute
voting rule that is strategyproof and satisfies PJR.
e above result highlights the necessity for an alternate approach to achieving proportional
representation, or the introduction of additional assumptions to circumvent this impossibility re-
sult. In the social choice literature for similar, but distinct, impossibility results there is a large
body of work which consider restrictions of voter preferences to achieve possibility results. Some
preference restrictions include single-peakedness of preferences [Arrow, 1951, Black, 1948], or
correlations of voter preferences [Mandal and Parkes, 2016, Sen et al., 2015]. In this paper, we
consider an alternate approach by moving to equilibrium analysis instead.
is equilibrium approach is justified on the basis that; (1) the axiom of proportional representa-
tion is focused on the idea that voters have diverse preferences, and the difficulty of satisfying this
axiom is due to precisely this diversity. us, any restriction to the diversity of voter preferences
is weakening both the constraint imposed by the PR axiom and also the conflict between voter
strategies and preferences – in a sense this approach is ‘giving up too much’. (2) the impossibility
result of [Peters, 2017] holds for a seing where voter preferences are already assumed to be re-
stricted to dichotomous preferences; thus, it is hard to justify even further preference restrictions
independent of the PR axiom. (3)e restriction of preferences to single-peakedness [Arrow, 1951,
Black, 1948], or value-restricted preferences [Sen, 1966], though at times seemingly innocuous, has
lile empirical support [Maei, 2011].
Before concluding this subsection, we note that impossibility result of [Peters, 2017] has only
been proven for deterministic voting rules. Indeed in various social choice seings it has been
8A resolute voting rule produces a single election outcome, rather than a set of outcomes.
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shown that randomised voting rules can sometimes be both necessary and sufficient to guar-
antee strategyproofness without resorting to a dictatorship; for example see [Aziz et al., 2014,
Aziz and Ye, 2014, Chen et al., 2013, Procaccia, 2010]. us, when considering randomised voting
rules is it unclear whether there is an incompatibility between strategyproof and PJR.
2.2 Equilibria and costly voting
is subsection formalises what is meant by a (pure) Nash equilibrium and describes the strategic,
or behavioural, effect of a costly voting environment. e costly voting environment leads to addi-
tional structure on voter preferences which are similar to those aained by the models considered
in [De Sinopoli and Iannantuoni, 2005, Elkind et al., 2015, Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1983].9
Definition 2.5. [Best response] If a voter i ∈ N faces a reported ballot profile Aˆ−i and
L(Aˆi,Aˆ−i ) %i L(Aˆ′i,Aˆ−i )
for all Aˆ′i ,
then Aˆi is a best response for voter i .
Definition 2.6. [Pure-Nash Equilibria (PNE)] A reported ballot profile Aˆ is a pure-Nash equilib-
rium (PNE) if for every voter i ∈ N the ballot Aˆi is a best response to Aˆ−i . If the loery L is the
output of a PNE reported profile Aˆ, then we say that L is supported by a PNE.
We also define what is meant by a pivotable voter. Given a voting rule and a voting instance;
informally, a voter is said to be pivotable if they can change the election outcome by changing
their reported ballot. us, when checking whether a profile of reported ballots is a PNE it suffices
to consider only pivotable voters.
Definition 2.7. [Pivotal voter] Given a voting rule and a reported ballot profile Aˆ, a voter i ∈ N
is said to be pivotable if there exists a report Aˆ′i , Aˆi such that
LAˆ , L(Aˆ′
i
,Aˆ−i )
.
Otherwise, the voter is said to be non-pivotable.
We now define how voters behave in a costly voting environment and define the corresponding
equilibrium concept.10 Consideration of a costly voting environment is motivated by the fact
that voting is in fact a costly activity, and applying game-theoretic analysis to voting games with
costless voting leads to the existence of equilibria which are not observed in practice. e costly
voting environment can be modelled by the introduction of a small cost experienced by voters
who participate in the election. It is important that the cost is sufficiently small to ensure that only
voters who are indifferent between the election outcome when they participate and when they
abstain are incentivised to abstain.
Definition 2.8. [Costly voting] Under costly voting, if a voter i ∈ N faces a reported ballot profile
Aˆ−i and L(∅,Aˆ−i ) %i L(Aˆ′i,Aˆ−i )
for all Aˆ′i , then voter i will optimally report Aˆi = ∅.
Definition 2.9. [Costly voting equilibrium] A reported ballot profile Aˆ is a costly voting equilib-
rium if Aˆ is a pure-Nash equilibrium and voters experience costly voting.
9In section 4 we define a costly voting refinement of the strong Nash equilibrium concept.
10 In the literature this behavioural tendency has been referred to a lazy voting [Elkind et al., 2015], voting with abstention
and also costly voting.
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3 ACHIEVING PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION UNDER SINCERE VOTING
is section introduces a strategically robust proportional representation voting rule, calledGreedy-
Monroe, and states properties of the voting rule which hold under sincere voting. We show that
under sincere voting the rule satisfies proportional justified representation (PJR), and is not strat-
egyproof.
e original GreedyMonroe voting rule was introduced by [Skowron et al., 2015], and further
studied by [Elkind et al., 2017, Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al., 2017]. We introduce a variant of the
GreedyMonroe voting rule which maintains the key representation properties of the original rule
but ensures strategic robustness, for simplicity we still refer to the voting rule as GreedyMonroe.
Let k denote the number of candidates to be elected, and n the number of voters. Our version of
the GreedyMonroe voting rule asks each voter to report their dichotomous preferences via an ap-
proval ballot Aˆi , then proceeds as follows: In the first-stage, the rule considers the set of candidates
C∗ who have approval support ≥ n/k and then elects a candidate uniform at random fromC∗ and
removes ⌈n/k⌉ approval ballots of voters who supported this now-elected candidate. With the up-
dated approval ballot profile the rule iteratively repeats the previous step until either a commiee
of size k is elected, or < k candidates have been elected and no candidate receives approval ≥ n/k .
In the laer case, a second-stage is used to uniformly at random select the remaining candidates
from the set of unelected candidates, i.e., regardless of the relative approval scores.
Note that the voting rule ensures that every elected candidate c in the first-stage represents at
least n/k distinct voters, and any voters who gave support for candidate c beyond ⌈n/k⌉ is able to
contribute their vote to another so-far-unelected candidate on their ballot. is process bears some
resemblance to a discrete re-weighting version of the well-known Single Transferable Vote (STV),
which is defined for strict-order preferences and used world-wide for achieving proportional rep-
resentation in national elections.11
evoting rule breaks ties using a uniform random tie-breaking rule. at is, given a tie between
a candidate setC∗ ⊆ C , each candidate is selected with probability 1
|C ∗ |
– the selected candidate is
the ‘winner’ of the tie-break. We provide a formal description of the voting rule in Algorithm 1.
ALGORITHM 1: (modified) GreedyMonroe algorithm
Require: Election size k , candidate set C , reported ballot profile Aˆ.
Ensure: A winning commieeW ⊆ C of size k .
1: Initialise W˜ = ∅,C ′ = C, Aˆ′ = Aˆ.
2: Let C∗ be the set of candidates c ′ ∈ C ′ such that s(c ′, Aˆ′) := |{i ∈ N : c ′ ∈ Aˆ′i }| ≥ n/k .
3: If |W˜ | < k and C∗ , ∅, select some candidate c∗ ∈ C∗ by a uniform random tie-breaking rule. Set
W˜ 7→ W˜ ∪ c∗, then remove precisely ⌈n/k⌉ ballot profiles from Aˆ′ with c∗ ∈ Aˆ′i (choosing voters
uniformly at random) and redefine C ′ 7→ C ′\{c∗}, and then repeat step 2.
4: If C∗ = ∅ or |W˜ | < k , then select the remaining (k − |W˜ |) candidates from C\W˜ via a uniform random
tie-breaking rule, to form a commieeW of size k such that W˜ ⊆W .
We highlight three strategically important features of the GreedyMonroe voting rule (Algo-
rithm 1): (1) the removal of ballots aer the election of candidates means that each voter’s ballot
is only considered once, and hence approving of more than one candidate is never strictly optimal
over approving a single candidate; (2) the sharp threshold of n/k creates an incentive for voters to
not provide additional support to candidates who already have ≥ n/k votes, (3) the quota-filling
11STV is used in countries such as Australia, India, Ireland and Pakistan. See within [Aziz and Lee, 2017] for a general
formulation of the STV voting rule and brief overview of its history.
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uniform random selection of candidates creates a loery over election outcomes. is loery acts
as a ‘punishment’ which creates an incentive for voters to coordinate themselves into group of
⌈n/k⌉ as to avoid (or minimise) the risk of the partially random election outcome.
In the special case that ‘k divides n’, i.e., the number of candidates to be elected k divides the
number of voters n, then the GreedyMonroe rule satisfies desirable proportional representation
properties. It was shown in [Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al., 2017], that when ‘k divides n’ voting rules
such as GreedyMonroe satisfies PJR when voters report sincerely. We state the result below and
refer the reader to [Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al., 2017] for details of the proof.
Proposition 3.1. [Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al., 2017] If ‘k divides n’, GreedyMonroe satisfies PJR
when voters are sincere.
As stated in the previous section, a deterministic voting rule which satisfies PJR and is strate-
gyproof does not exist [Peters, 2017]. is result equally applies to the case where ‘k divides n’.
e GreedyMonroe voting rule satisfies PJR (under sincere voting), however, it is not deterministic.
Nonetheless, we prove in the following theorem (via an example) that it is still not strategyproof
– the proof can be found in the appendix.
Theorem 3.2. e GreedyMonroe is not strategyproof.
3.1 Does the voting rule maer?
It is well-known that, in elections with more than two voters and a standard voting rule, any elec-
tion outcome can be supported by a PNE [De Sinopoli and Iannantuoni, 2005, Footnote 1]. us
a natural questions arises “Does the voting rule maer?” since we are interested in constructing
strategically robust voting rules which aain PR in equilibrium. We argue that indeed the voting
rule does maer. It has been noted by a number of scholars that considering elections within a
costly voting environment is essential to aain predictive power from equilibria analysis. us
our focus is on costly voting equilibria, and within this environment it is no longer true that, un-
der standard voting rules, any election outcome can be supported by a PNE. Furthermore and as a
point of illustration the most commonly applied voting rule for dichotomous preferences, referred
to as the AV-rule or simply approval voting,12 can be shown to fail our definition of strategic robust-
ness; that is, there need not be any costly voting equilibria which satisfy PJR. In fact the AV-rule
need not have any costly voting equilibrium – we provide a formal statement and proof of this in
the appendix.
4 INSINCERE BUT DESIRABLE EQUILIBRIA: EXISTENCE
Wenow prove the existence of a PJR outcome supported by a PNE, under theGreedyMonroe voting
rule. is PNE, and details within the proof, will be integral to extending the result to the more
appropriate costly voting equilibrium concept. It is important to note that the PNE constructed in
this theorem have additional desirable features; such as the fact that a voter is never required to
report to approve of a candidate which they do not truthfully approve of.
e intuition of the theorem can be understood as follows. Consider a two-stage process; voters
first observe a perfectly accurate pre-election poll which announces the guaranteed winners from
a sincere election outcome based on the poll, then voters sequentially remove their votes for any
unelected/losing candidate(s). In addition, since the GreedyMonroe voting rule considers each
ballot at most once, every voters removes any ‘excess’ votes for a winning candidate13 – thus,
12see [Brams and Fishburn, 1978, Weber, 1978].
13is type of behaviour whereby voters remove their vote from candidates with excess support to other candidates (or
decide to abstain) is analogous to the “Chicken” effect referred to by [Cox and Shugart, 1996].
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restricting their vote to at most one (winning) candidate in election. Lastly, there exists at least
one such partition which ensures the actual outcome still coincides with the outcome as per the
poll announcement.
Theorem 4.1. Let the voting rule be GreedyMonroe, and assume k divides n. ere exists a PNE Aˆ
supporting a PJR outcome with respect to A, such that Aˆi ⊆ Ai for all i ∈ N . Furthermore, this PNE
coincides with the sincere voting outcome.
Proof. Let W˜ = {c1, . . . , c j } be the set of j ≤ k candidates elected in the first-stage of the
GreedyMonroe rule when voters are sincere. For each candidate ct ∈ W˜ let Nt denote the set
of n/k voters who unanimously and truthfully supported candidate ct , and were then selected to
have their ballots removed (line 3 of the voting rule).
e reported ballot profile Aˆ which will be shown to be a PNE is constructed as follows: For
each t ∈ {1, . . . , j}, set Aˆi = {ct } for all i ∈ Nt (note that there are precisely n/k such voters in
each Nt ). For all other voters set Aˆi = ∅.
At the termination of this procedure we have a reported ballot profile Aˆ such that all candidates
in W˜ receive precisely n/k reported approvals and all other candidates receive zero. us, the
only pivotable voters who can change the election outcome are those such that Aˆi = {c} for some
candidate c (since n/k > 1). Furthermore, for all voters i ∈ N we have Aˆi ⊆ Ai – hence voters
approve of their reported approval (w.r.t. true preferences Ai ).
Also note that the outcome of Aˆ under GreedyMonroe is a setW ′ which contains W˜ with prob-
ability one (i.e. all candidates in W˜ are necessarily selected). us with probability one PJR is
satisfied w.r.t. the true preferences A.
It remains to show that this is a PNE. Suppose that a voter i ∈ N has a (strictly) profitable
deviation Aˆ′i , Aˆi , then it must be the case that this voter is pivotable and so Aˆi = {c}. ere are
two cases to consider which can arise when Aˆ′i is submied.
Case 1: Nothing happens with probability one. is occurs if c ∈ Aˆ′i and there is no other
candidate c ′ ∈ Aˆ′i and also c
′ ∈ W˜ – thus, W˜ is still elected with probability one, and the distribu-
tion/loery of election outcomes is unchanged. is contradicts the assumption that Aˆ′ is (strictly)
profitable, since the voter is indifferent between both ballots Aˆi and Aˆ
′
i .
Case 2: Candidate c is removed from the election outcome with non-zero probability in line 3 of
the voting rule. is can occur if c < Aˆ′i and/or there is another candidate c
′ ∈ Aˆ′i and also c
′ ∈ W˜ .
We now show that this can never be strictly profitable.
Within Case 2, in the non-zero probability event that candidate c is not elected in line 3 of the
voting rule, the rule selects k − |W˜ | + 1 candidates uniformly at random from the set of unelected
candidates (C\W˜ )∪{c}. Note that alternatively when c is elected in line 3 (or under the equilibrium
profile Aˆ), the rule selects just k − |W˜ | candidates uniformly at random from the set of unelected
candidates C\W˜ .
To analyse this case we must consider the number of candidates which voter i disapproves of
in the set (C\W˜ ) ∪ {c}, we denote this by
ℓ = |
(
(C\W˜ ) ∪ {c}
)
\Ai |.
We assume that ℓ > 0, otherwise voter i is indifferent between the loeries induced by Aˆi and Aˆ
′
i
which contradicts the assumption that Aˆ′i is strictly profitable.
Now if ℓ ≥ k − |W˜ | + 1 then the worst-case (non-zero probability) outcome produced from Aˆ′i
includes precisely one less (truthfully) approved candidate in the winning commiee. is follows
since when voter i submits Aˆ′i with non-zero probability the candidates inW˜ \{c} are elected along
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with k − |W˜ | + 1 disapproved candidates – whilst, under Aˆi the worst-case outcome includes W˜
and just k − |W˜ | disapproved candidates.14 us, we conclude that voter i strictly prefers Aˆi over
Aˆ′i (under the ul-extension of preferences to loeries).
Now suppose that 0 < ℓ < k−|W˜ |+1, and again denote the loeries under Aˆi and Aˆ
′
i by L and L
′.
e worst-case outcomesW andW ′ induced by L and L′, respectively, are equally preferred and
are aained under either loery with non-zero probability when all ℓ disapproved candidates from
C\W˜ are elected. Denote the number of candidates involved in the random loery L bym = |C\W˜ |,
and denote the number of candidates to be elected in this loery by j = k − |W˜ |. e probabilities
of these worst-case outcomes being achieved (conditional on candidate c being unelected in lines
3 of the voting rule) is given by the hypergeometric distribution.
To see this consider the following reformulation; under loery L, the worst-case outcome is
when, with the j selection of candidates amongm choices, all ℓ disapproved candidates are elected.
is is analogous to the ‘urn problem’ of calculating the probability that from an urn, with ℓ blue
balls andm − ℓ white balls, j draws (without replacement) leads to all ℓ blue balls being drawn. In
particular, this probability is given by the hypergeometric distribution (seewithin [Johnson and Kotz,
1977] for details):
P
(i )
L
(ℓ) =
(
ℓ
ℓ
) (m−ℓ
j−ℓ
)
(m
j
) =
(m−ℓ
j−ℓ
)
(m
j
)
whilst, under L′ we have P
(i )
L′
(ℓ) =
(m+1−ℓ
j+1−ℓ
)
/
(m+1
j+1
)
. is follows since the loery under L′, (j +
1) draws are made from the set of (m + 1) candidates (C\W˜ ) ∪ {c} which still only includes ℓ
disapproved candidates (recall that c ∈ Ai ). However, notice that
P
(i )
L′
(ℓ) =
(m+1−ℓ
j+1−ℓ
)
(m+1
j+1
) =
m+1−ℓ
j+1−ℓ
(m−ℓ
j−ℓ
)
m+1
j+1
(m
j
) =
m+1−ℓ
j+1−ℓ
m+1
j+1
P
(i )
L
(ℓ).
and for positivem, j, ℓ such that j + 1 > ℓ we have
m + 1 − ℓ
j + 1 − ℓ
j + 1
m + 1
> 1 ⇐⇒ (m + 1 − ℓ)(j + 1) > (j + 1 − ℓ)(m + 1) ⇐⇒ ℓ(m − j) > 0,
which clearly holds since 0 < ℓ < j + 1 ≤ m. us, we have P
(i )
L′
(ℓ) > P
(i )
L
(ℓ).
us, the probability (conditional that c was not elected in line 3 of the voting rule) that the ℓ
disapproved candidates are elected from the (random quota-filling) draw induced by L is strictly
less than that under L′.
Now denote the number of approved candidates in the worst-case outcomesW andW ′ induced
by L and L′, respectively, by α (note that bothW andW ′ are equally preferred and so have the same
number of approved candidates). Under the ul-extension, if the worst-case outcomes are equally
preferred under both loeries we compare the (unconditional) probabilities that this worst-case
outcome is aained, i.e., pi
(i )
L
(α) andpi
(i )
L′
(α). Under the loery L′, there are two non-zero probability
events; (1) candidate c is elected in lines 3 of voting rule and then k − |W˜ | candidates are elected
from C\W˜ , or (2) candidate c is not elected in lines 3 of the voting rule and then k − |W˜ | + 1
candidates are elected from (C\W˜ ) ∪ {c}. Denote the probabilities of these events by p1 and p2,
respectively, note that 0 < p1 < 1 and p2 = 1 − p1.
For loery L’, conditional of event (1), the probability that the worst-case outcome is achieved is
given by P
(i )
L
(ℓ) (i.e. the same as under loery L) and conditional of event (2), the probability that
14Note that candidate c ∈ W˜ is truthfully approved by voter i , i.e., c ∈ Ai .
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the worst-case outcome is achieved is given by P
(i )
L′
(ℓ). Note that the probability that the worst-
case outcome is aained under L is simply P
(i )
L
(ℓ), since candidate c is elected at line 3 of the voting
rule with probability one. us, we have
pi
(i )
L′
(α) = p1P
(i )
L
(ℓ) + p2P
(i )
L′
(ℓ)
> p1P
(i )
L
(ℓ) + p2P
(i )
L
(ℓ) since P
(i )
L′
(ℓ) > P
(i )
L
(ℓ)
=⇒ pi
(i )
L′
(α) > pi
(i )
L
(α).
at is, the worst-case outcome (which is equivalent under L and L′) is strictly more likely under L′.
We conclude that voter i strictly prefers the loery L over L′, and hence we have a contradiction
since Aˆ′i can not be a strictly profitable deviation. us, the reported ballot profile Aˆ is a PNE and
the election outcomeW satisfies PJR with respect to the true preferences. 
Turning our focus to the costly voting equilibrium concept, we identify a sufficient condition
to ensure that the PJR equilibrium outcome from the previous theorem which coincides with the
sincere outcome is also a costly voting equilibrium (eorem 4.2). e sufficiency condition (As-
sumption 2) is then shown to be ‘tight’ in the sense that in general without the sufficiency con-
dition the sincere voting outcome need not be possible to sustain in a costly voting environment
(eorem 4.3).
For future reference, we formally define this ‘sufficiency condition’ as an assumption but it
will be made explicit in the statements of results whether this condition is indeed required. e
condition requires that every candidate (truthfully) disapproves of at least k candidates. Informally,
this condition ensures that there are enough ‘disapproved’ candidates to incentivise voters to vote
according to a costly voting equilibrium, and avoid the random quota-filling feature of the voting
rule.
Assumption 2. [Sufficiency condition]We say that the ‘sufficiency condition’ holds if every voter
disapproves of at least k candidates in C with respect to their true preferences; that is,
|C\Ai | ≥ k for all voters i ∈ N .
Remark 3. Under a party-seat reformulation of the election model whereby p political parties (each
with at least k candidates) contest for seats and voters cast votes based on a candidate’s party, the
sufficiency condition simply requires that each voter disapproves of at least one party.
With this sufficiency condition (Assumption 2), the result ofeorem 4.1 can be maintained in a
costly voting environment. at is, a PJR outcome can be supported by a costly voting equilibrium.
is is achieved by ensuring that every non-abstaining voter is pivotable and strictly prefers to
participate than to abstain.
Theorem 4.2. Let the voting rule be GreedyMonroe, and assume k divides n. If every voter i ∈ N
disapproves of at least k candidates in C (i.e. Assumption 2 holds) then there exists a costly voting
equilibrium Aˆ supporting a PJR outcome such that Ai ⊆ Aˆi for all i ∈ N . Furthermore, this costly
voting equilibrium coincides with a sincere voting outcome under the GreedyMonroe rule.
Proof. Let Aˆ be the PNE equilibrium constructed in eorem 4.1. Let W˜ be the associated
subset of candidates elected in the first-stage of GreedyMonroe under Aˆ.
Given that Aˆ is a PNE, it only remains to prove that this is indeed a costly voting equilibrium.
at is, it suffices to show that abstaining is never weakly preferred by a non-abstaining voter.
Let voter i ∈ N be such that Aˆi = {c}, if voter i were to abstain from voting then the worst-case
(non-zero probability) election outcome would exclude the (truthfully) approved candidate c from
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the election outcome and include W˜ \{c} and k + 1− |W˜ | disapproved candidates fromC\W˜ (such
a number of disapproved candidates inC\W˜ is guaranteed to exist by Assumption 2. Whilst when
voter i does not abstain and reports Aˆi = {c} the worst-case election outcome includes W˜ and
just k − |W˜ | disapproved candidates – this means that precisely one additional approved candidate
is included in the worst-case outcome compared to the worst-case outcome when she abstains.15
us, the voter strictly prefers to vote than to abstain and the ballot profile is a costly voting
equilibrium.
e final statement follows immediately since the costly voting equilibrium Aˆ is precisely the
same as the PNE in eorem 4.1 which supports a PJR outcome which coincides with the sincere
voting outcome. 
In general however, the above theorem does not hold. at is, the sufficient condition is ‘tight’.
Theorem 4.3. Consider the GreedyMonroe voting rule and suppose ‘k divides n’. If every voter
i ∈ N does not disapprove of at least k candidates in C (i.e., Assumption 2 does not hold) then, in
general, a PJR outcome which coincides with the sincere outcome can not be supported as a costly
voting equilibrium. at is, the sufficiency condition in eorem 4.2 is ‘tight’.
Proof. Consider the following example; let |N | = 4,k = 2,C = {a,b, c} and the preferences of
voters be as follows:
A1 = {a,b, c},A2 = {a},A3 = A4 = ∅.
Under GreedyMonroe with sincere voting the election outcomeW includes candidate a with prob-
ability one. Whilst, the only costly voting equilibrium is Aˆi = ∅ for all i ∈ N which leads to an
election outcome which need not include candidate a. To see this observe that in every costly vot-
ing equilibrium it must be the case that Aˆ1 = Aˆ3 = Aˆ4 = ∅, since voters 1, 3, and 4, are indifferent
between all election outcomes and hence indifferent between all loeries. But n/k = 2 > 1, and
so voter 2 cannot ensure the election of candidate a and hence will also abstain. us, the sincere
election outcome need not be aainable as a costly voting equilibrium. 
We now consider the equilibria of the GreedyMonroe rule when a stronger equilibrium concept
is applied. Under the Nash equilibrium (and also the costly voting equilibrium) concept, an equi-
librium occurs when no voter can strictly profit from a unilateral deviation. is however, does
not capture the possibility that voters may engage in coalitions to gain strategic advantage. To
capture this idea we consider the notion of strong Nash equilibria (introduced in [Aumann, 1959])
and the costly voting version strong costly voting equilibria. Both concepts are formally defined
below.
Recall that given a ballot profile Aˆ and voting rule, we denote the loery of election outcomes
produced by the voting rule by LAˆ. Furthermore, given a set of voters S ⊆ N we denote the
reported ballots of voters in S by AˆS ; that is, AˆS = (Aˆi )i ∈S .
Definition 4.4. [Strong (pure) Nash equilibrium (strong PNE)] A reported ballot profile Aˆ is a
strong PNE if for every S ⊆ N , there does not exist any set of ballot profiles Aˆ′
S
= (Aˆ′i )i ∈S such
that
L(Aˆ′
S
,AˆN \S )
≻i LAˆ for all i ∈ S .
Definition 4.5. [Strong costly voting equilibrium] A reported ballot profile Aˆ is a strong costly
voting equilibrium if it is a strong PNE and also a costly voting equilibrium.
15Note that this corresponds precisely to the case where ℓ ≥ k − |W˜ | + 1 within the proof of eorem 4.1.
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Remark 4. A strong PNE is weakly Pareto efficient [Aumann, 1959]. is is also true for strong
costly voting equilibria.
Considering the strong costly voting equilibrium reduces the number of equilibria admied by
the GreedyMonroe voting rule. For example, the reported profile Aˆ = ∅, i.e. where all voters
abstain, is a costly voting equilibrium for all preference profiles since n/k > 1 and so there is no
profitable unilateral deviation for any voter. However, under the strong costly voting equilibrium
this is no longer the case since coalitions of sizes at least n/k may be able to find strictly profitable
deviations.
e following result shows that every strong costly voting equilibrium is desirable in terms
of proportional representation. at is, there are no equilibria which do not satisfy PJR. is is
stated and proven in the theorem below. We note however, that the result does not guarantee the
existence of such an equilibrium for every preference profile.
e intuition for the result is as follows: If there was a strong costly voting equilibrium which
did not satisfy PJR then there would be a group of voters X with |X | ≥ ℓn/k (for some positive
integer ℓ) who are represented by strictly less than ℓ candidates in ∪i ∈XAi , and also unanimously
support ≥ ℓ candidates (i.e. those in ∩i ∈XAi ). But, under the GreedyMonroe rule, this group can
ensure at least ℓ candidates in ∩i ∈XAi are elected since they are a group of size ≥ ℓn/k , and so as
a group there is a deviation which strictly benefits every voter in X .
Theorem 4.6. Let the voting rule be GreedyMonroe, and assume k divides n. Every strong costly
voting equilibrium satisfies PJR.
Proof. Suppose for the purpose of a contradiction that Aˆ is a strong costly voting equilibrium,
let L denote the loery over election outcome under Aˆ, and letW be a some realised outcome.
For the purpose of a contradiction suppose that Aˆ does not satisfy PJR; that is, there exists a
realised outcome, sayW , which does not satisfy PJR. us, there exists a positive integer ℓ and a
group of voter X with |X | ≥ ℓn/k and | ∩i ∈X Ai | ≥ ℓ such that
|W ∩ (∪i ∈XAi )| < ℓ.
It follows that for all i ∈ X , |W ∩Ai | < ℓ.
Now consider the deviation such that Aˆ′i = ∩i ∈XAi for all i ∈ X . Under this deviation, when
all other voters strategies are unchanged,16 the GreedyMonroe elects at least ℓ candidates from
∩i ∈XAi with probability one. To see this note that there are ≥ ℓn/k voters unanimously supporting
≥ ℓ candidates, thus the first-stage of GreedyMonroe can not terminate without ≥ ℓ candidates in
∩i ∈XAi being elected.
us, if L′ denotes the loery under the deviation by group X then every election outcomeW ′
is such that we have |W ′∩Ai | ≥ ℓ for all i ∈ X . It follows immediately that under theul-extension
of preferences every voter strictly prefers the loery L′ over L (the worst-case outcome under L′
is strictly beer than that under L). us, every voter in the group X is strictly beer off from the
deviation, and so Aˆ cannot be a strong costly voting equilibrium which is a contradiction. 
4.1 An impossibility result in the implementation of proportional representation
e previous sections were focused on the existence of robust voting rules which admit at least one
equilibrium which satisfy proportional representation. A natural question is whether all equilibria
of the voting rule satisfy proportional representation and, if not, does there exist such a voting rule?
Within the literature of implementation theory, if such a voting rule were to exist it would be said
to fully implement proportional representation. A voting rule which fully implements proportional
16In fact this argument holds even if we allow other coalitions to simultaneously deviate
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representation is indeed desirable since, without the ability to coordinate voter beliefs about others’
actions, there is no guarantee that the desirable equilibria constructed in the previous section will
actually be aained. Unfortunately, if there exists such a deterministic voting rule then it must be
the case that there exists instances such that a costly voting equilibrium need not exist (in such
cases the voting rule may be considered to be ‘degenerate’).
We begin by defining an arbitrary voting rule and the relevant parameters; Let M be a finite
message space which voters take actions in, and given a positive integer k , denote the space of all
candidate subsets ofC with size k byWk . Let ∆(Wk ) denote the set of all loeries over elements of
Wk . Note that the message space M is an arbitrary action space and is not restricted to approval
ballots. Given k and n (the pre-determined size of the election outcome and number of voters),
a voting rule is a mapping of a sequence of n elements of M to an element of ∆(Wk ). at is,
V(n,k) :
∏n
i=1M → ∆(Wk ).
If a voting rule treats all voters equally then the voting rule is considered to anonymous. More
formally, a voting rule V(n,k) is anonymous if given any input of ‘votes’, say (m1, . . . ,mm), any
reordering (or permutation) of the inputs leads to the same outcome, i.e., V(n,k)(m1, . . . ,mn) =
V(n,k)(mσ (1), . . . ,mσ (n)) for all permutations σ : [n] → [n].
We now prove an impossibility results which shows that there is no resolute, anonymous and
deterministic voting rule which fully implements PJR and also guarantees the existence of costly
voting equilibria.
e intuition for the proof is as follows; if a voting rule guarantees the existence of equilibria
and fully implements PJR then there must exist an equilibrium for every preference profile – even
in the case where PJR is trivially satisfied. Under a deterministic voting rule, when electing two
candidates out of three, there is one candidate, say c , who is necessarily excluded from the equi-
librium mˆ election outcome under preference profile A. We then consider an alternate but similar
preference profile, A′ which requires that candidate c is elected for PJR. us, if the voting rule
fully implements PJR there must exist a deviation from mˆ under the preference A′. e similarity
between the two preference profiles A and A′ considered shows that this deviation must have in
fact been an available and profitable deviation from mˆ in the original equilibrium under profile
preferences A – this contradicts the original equilibrium.
Theorem 4.7. [Impossibility of (deterministic) PJR implementation] Any resolute, anonymous,
and deterministic voting rule which always admits at least one costly voting equilibrium, does not
fully implement PJR.
Proof. Let |N | = 4,k = 2,C = {a,b, c}. Suppose for the purpose of a contradiction thatV(n,k) is
a resolute, anonymous, and deterministic voting rule which fully implements PJR in costly voting
equilibria, and always admits at least one equilibrium for every preference profile.
Let the preference profile A be
A1 = {a},A2 = {b},A3 = {c},A4 = ∅.
By assumption there exists a costly voting equilibrium, say mˆ ∈
∏4
i=1M , due to symmetry and
without loss of generality assume that the election outcome isW = {a,b}; that is,
V(n,k)(mˆ1,mˆ2,mˆ3,mˆ4) = {a,b}. (2)
Note that this trivially satisfies PJR. Furthermore, given the preference profile, a necessary condi-
tion for a costly voting equilibrium to support the outcomeW is that mˆ3 = mˆ4 = ∅.
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is follows because the outcomeW is voter 3’s least preferred outcome, and voter 4 is indiffer-
ent between all election outcomes. us, (2) simplifies to
V(n,k)(mˆ1,mˆ2, ∅, ∅) = {a,b}. (3)
Now consider the alternate preference profile A′
A′1 = {a},A
′
2 = {b},A
′
3 = {c},A
′
4 = {c}.
Clearly,W does not satisfy PJR for the profileA′ and so mˆmust not be an equilibrium, sinceV(n,k) is
assumed to fully implement JR. In particular, there must exists a voter i ∈ N such that a unilateral
deviation leads to a strictly more preferred election outcome. Since voters 1, 2, 3 have the same
preferences under A (and mˆ is an equilibrium for A) there can be no profitable deviation for these
voters. us, voter 4 must have a strictly profitable deviation, say mˆ′4 , ∅, which leads to a new
election outcome including candidate c; that is,
V(n,k)(mˆ1,mˆ2, ∅,mˆ
′
4) =W such that c ∈W .
Furthermore, by the anonymity of the voting rule V(n,k) we also have
V(n,k)(mˆ1,mˆ2,mˆ
′
4, ∅) =W such that c ∈W .
But this contradicts the assumption that mˆ is an equilibrium for the original preference profile A,
since if voter 3 deviates and reports mˆ3 = mˆ
′
4 in (3) then a strictly preferred election outcome will
be produced. We conclude that there is no such voting rule V(n,k) – this completes the proof. 
Remark 5. If voters have worst-case preference extensions, then the above impossibility result fol-
lows identically for random voting rules and/or if we allow mixed-strategies.
We conclude by highlighting that despite the impossibility result, under the costly voting equi-
librium concept, it is unclear whether the impossibility result holds for the strong costly voting
equilibrium concept.
5 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In this paper we proposed an alternate equilibrium approach for achieving PR in the presence
of strategic voters. Within the seing of voters with dichotomous preferences over candidates,
we designed a strategically robust PR-based voting rule, called GreedyMonroe, which is not strat-
egyproof but ensures the existence of (possibly insincere) costly voting equilibria satisfying PR
with respect to voters’ private and unrevealed preferences. In contrast, the commonly applied
AV-rule was shown not to be strategically robust. Furthermore, we proved a limit on ‘how strate-
gically robust’ a PR-based voting rule can be; we showed that there is no PR-based voting rule17
which ensures that every costly voting equilibrium satisfies PR. Collectively, these results high-
light the possibility and limit of achieving PR in the presence of strategic voters and a positive role
for mechanisms, such as pre-election polls, which coordinate voter behaviour towards equilibria
which satisfy PR.
ere still remains many natural and unanswered questions in this line of research such as
whether best response dynamics converge to equilibria, extending equilibria results to more gen-
eral preference domains, and extending our impossibility result to random mechanisms.
17We assumed the voting rule is deterministic, resolute and anonymous.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 Omied proofs Section 3
Proof of Theorem 3.2. We prove the claim explicitly via a counter-example. Let |N | = 6, C =
{a,b, c,d} and k = 3 with
A1 = {c}
A2 = {c,b}
A3,A4 = {b}
A5,A6 = {d}.
For the purpose of a contradiction suppose that the voting rule is strategyproof; that is, Aˆi = Ai
must be a best response for all voters. Under the sincere ballot profile Aˆ = A, from voter 2’s
perspective theworst-case (non-zero probability) election outcome isW = {b,d,a}which includes
just one of voter 2’s (truthfully) approved candidates, i.e., |W ∩ A2 | = 1. is occur if in the first
iteration of the first-stage candidate b is elected and then the two voters selected to have their
ballot removed includes voter 2 – in this case, candidate c will no longer have sufficient support
to guarantee election.
Now, if voter 2 deviates and instead reports the insincere ballot Aˆ′2 = {c} then with probability
one the election outcome isW ′ = {b, c,d} which includes two of voters 2’s (truthfully) approved
candidates.
us if we denote the loery under sincere voting by L and the loery under voter 2’s unilateral
deviation by L′, we have pi
(2)
L′
(0) = pi
(2)
L
(0) = 0 and pi
(2)
L′
(1) = 0 < pi
(2)
L
(1), thus L′ ≻2 L. at is, voter
2 has a strictly profitable deviation from Aˆ2 = A2, and hence the GreedyMonroe voting rule is not
strategyproof. 
A.2 Omied proofs Section 3.1
e AV-rule is an approval-based election rule which selects the k candidates with the highest
approval scores with respect to the reported ballots Aˆ, i.e. the approval score of a candidate c with
respect to Aˆ is s(c, Aˆ) = |{i ∈ N : c ∈ Aˆi }|. In case of ties, a uniform at random tie-breaking rule
is assumed to apply.18
Proposition A.1. Under the AV voting rule, there need not be any costly voting equilibrium sup-
porting a PJR outcome.
18Other tie-breaking rules can be applied here (deterministic or random) without affecting the properties considered in
this section.
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Proof. Let |N | = 4,k = 2,C = {a,b, c} and the preference profile be given as follows:
A1,A2 = {a}
A3 = {b, c}
A4 = ∅.
For the purpose of a contradiction suppose that there exists a reported ballot profile Aˆ such that
PJR is satisfied in every non-zero probability election outcome; that is, candidate a is elected with
probability one.
First note A4 = ∅, and so it must be that Aˆ4 = ∅ since Aˆ is a costly voting equilibrium. Further-
more, notice that since candidate a is elected with probability one in equilibrium, voter 3 must
abstain from voting since for every (non-zero probability) election outcome in this equilibrium,
sayW , we have |W ∩ A3 | = 1; that is, pi
(3)
L
(1) = 1 where L is the equilibrium induced loery. But
by the pigeon-hole principle every election outcomeW ′ of size k = 2 guarantees |W ′ ∩ A3 | ≥ 1 –
and so voter 3 can do no worse by abstaining. We conclude that if PJR is satisfied in a costly voting
equilibrium then Aˆ3 = Aˆ4 = ∅.
It now follows that the approval scores are such that
min{s(b, Aˆ), s(c, Aˆ)} + 1 < s(a, Aˆ),
otherwise, voter 3 could deviate from Aˆ3 = ∅ and submit Aˆ
′
3 = {b, c} – this would induce a
new loery L′ such that pi
(3)
L′
(1) < 1 = pi
(3)
L
(1), and hence L′ ≻3 L which would contradict the
equilibrium Aˆ. In addition, min{s(b, Aˆ), s(c, Aˆ)} ≥ 0 and s(a, Aˆ) ≤ 2 since at most 2 voters submit
non-empty ballots. us,
0 ≤min{s(b, Aˆ), s(c, Aˆ)} + 1 < s(a, Aˆ) ≤ 2,
which implies, due to the integer-valued s(·, ·) function, that
min{s(b, Aˆ), s(c, Aˆ)} = 0 and s(a, Aˆ) = 2.
We immediately infer that a ∈ Aˆ1, Aˆ2. Without loss of generality assume s(c, Aˆ) = 0. Now suppose
voter 1 deviates and abstains from voting, i.e, Aˆ′1 = ∅, leading to the new (off-equilibrium) ballot
profile Aˆ = (Aˆ′1, Aˆ−1) and induced loery L
′. Under this loery, since s(c, Aˆ′) = 0 and s(a, Aˆ′) = 1,
candidate a is elected with probability one under L′ and so voter 1 is indifferent between the ballots
Aˆ1 , ∅ and Aˆ
′
1 = ∅. us, voter 1 will optimally deviate from Aˆ – this contradicts the assumption
that Aˆ is a costly voting equilibrium. We conclude that under the AV-rule, in this instance there is
no PJR outcome supported by a costly voting equilibrium. 
